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CAPITAL DEFENSE LAWYERS: THE GOOD,
THE BAD, AND THE UGLY
Sean D. O'Brien*
LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN CAPITAL

CASES. By Welsh S. White. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 2006.

Pp. 219. Cloth, $60; paper, $21.95.
INTRODUCTION

Professor Welsh S. White's' book Litigating in the Shadow of Death:
Defense Attorneys in CapitalCases collects the compelling stories of "a new
band of dedicated lawyers" that has "vigorously represented capital defendants, seeking to prevent their executions" (p.3). Sadly, Professor White
passed away on New Year's Eve, 2005, days before the release of his final
work. To the well-deserved accolades of Professor White that were recently
published in the Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law,2 I can only add a
poignant comment in a student blog that captures his excellence as a scholar
and educator: "I wanted to spend more time being taught by him. 3
Another colleague stated, "He believed very strongly that the way [in]
which the death penalty is carried out in the United States is unfair and
inhumane and violates the Constitution. He stood up for what he believed
and was very influential in doing that. 4 Professor White's book is a
wonderful parting gift from a scholar and humanitarian. The book advances
his cause by exposing the Achilles Heel of capital punishment: the Court's
unwillingness to guarantee adequate legal representation to every person
accused of a capital crime. It may be his most influential publication on the
death penalty.
The book explores the work of defense attorneys, both good and bad, on
behalf of prisoners in capital cases. Professor White interviewed over thirty
lawyers "identified as among the most skilled capital defense attorneys in
*
Visiting Professor, University of Missouri, Kansas City School of Law, and a capital
defense attorney. Two of Mr. O'Brien's cases are discussed in chapter seven of Professor White's
book.
I.

Late Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.

2.

See Andrew E. Taslitz, A GratefulStudent's Farewellto Welsh White, 4

OHIO

ST. J. CRIM.

L. 5 (2006); John T. Parry, Tribute: Remembering Welsh White, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 11 (2006);
James Tomkovicz, Welsh White: A Farewellto a Generous Spirit, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 19 (2006);

John Burkoff, Remembering Welsh White, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 15 (2006).
3.
Posting of Russell Lucas to Attorney/Wastrel, http://www.attomey-wastrel.blogspot.com/
2006/O/professor-welsh-white.html (Jan. 2, 2006, 23:11 EST) (last visited July 10, 2006).
4. Leigh Remizowski, Remembering prof. Welsh White, PrrT NEWS, Jan. 20, 2006,
http://www.pittnews.cominews/2006/01/20/ (follow "Remembering prof. Welsh White" hyperlink)
(quoting University of Pittsburgh Law Professor John Burkoff).
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the country" (p. 10). He also examined records in capital cases, "including
cases in which attorneys superbly represented capital defendants and others
in which their representation was problematic for some reason" (p. 11). By
presenting his findings, Professor White establishes that the current system
of providing representation to people accused of capital crimes contributes
significantly to the arbitrariness of the death penalty. As the recent verdict in
the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui amply demonstrates, a defendant fortunate
enough to be appointed a dedicated capital defense attorney can avoid the
death penalty even in the most aggravated case.' On the other hand, a defendant represented by less conscientious or less experienced counsel runs a
substantial risk of being executed, even if he is innocent. 6 Professor White's
book illustrates the role that each type of lawyer plays in the current system
of capital punishment.
The best way to appreciate the significance of Professor White's book is
to begin with portions of his final paragraph: "Following the example of
Anthony Amsterdam in the pre-Furman era, defense attorneys have transformed our understanding of the modem system of capital punishment,
identifying fundamental problems with the way it operates" (p. 208). Executions will most likely continue at a rate of over fifty per year, yet Professor
White believes that:
[J]ust as a defense attorney's compelling narrative of injustice can produce
a favorable result for a particular capital defendant, defense attorneys'
compelling narratives of the series of injustices perpetrated by the modem
system of capital punishment may lead to a continuing decline in the use
of the death penalty, and eventually to its outright abolition." (p. 208)
Most readers who undertake the journey described in Professor White's
book will find themselves in agreement with him.
This review focuses on White's discussion of capital defense attorneys
and the current judicial and ABA standards that govern them. Part I discusses the Strickland standard for deciding claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel and how it has failed to ensure that capital defendants receive
competent representation. Part II discusses Professor White's exploration of
the differences between dedicated capital defense lawyers and less experienced or less committed lawyers and their approaches to innocence claims,
aggravated cases, plea bargaining, and appeals. Professor White contends
that if courts were to more rigorously apply some of their ineffective assistance precedents-particularly those about investigating mitigating
factors-we would see fewer individuals sentenced to death. While I agree
with Professor White's conclusion, I believe we are missing an important
part of the story. Professor White correctly concludes that exhaustive investigation marks the difference between effective capital defense attorneys and

5. See Neil A. Lewis, Moussaoui Given Life Term By Jury Over Link to 9/11, N.Y. TIMES,
May 4, 2006, at Al.
6. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Essay, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Notfor the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
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other defense lawyers, but he provides few details about the investigative
process behind the successful defenses discussed in his book. It would have
been helpful to hear how the dedicated lawyers portrayed in his book obtained the time and resources needed to assemble a competent defense team
and thoroughly investigate the client's life history.
I.

THE STRICKLAND STANDARD'S WEAK PROTECTION

Professor White suggests that "one approach to upgrading the quality of
lawyers' representations in capital cases would be to rigorously enforce the
constitutional guarantee to effective assistance in all criminal cases, or at
least in all capital cases" (p. 13). Unfortunately, the standard adopted by the
Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington7 "gave capital defendants relatively weak protection against ineffective representation" (p. 13). Under
Strickland, a capital prisoner must show not only that counsel's performance
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,"" but also that there is
"a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."9 In Strickland and in
subsequent cases, the Court indicated "that it might be difficult for a capital
defendant to establish that his lawyer's deficient performance resulted in
prejudice" (p. 16).
An overview of capital representation in America makes it clear that
Strickland does not adequately safeguard these defendants. Professor White
notes, "As the pace of executions increased, it became increasingly clear that
defense attorneys' representation of capital defendants was sometimes shockingly inadequate" (p. 3). A 1990 study by the American Bar Association
uncovered widespread problems with legal services for capital defendants.' °
Professor White substantiates these condemnations with specific examples
of glaring incompetence, or worse, on the part of attorneys purporting to
represent capitally charged defendants.
One attorney, for example, was out of the courthouse parking his car while
the key prosecution witness was testifying. Another attorney, in front of the
jury, referred to his client as a 'nigger.'. .. Yet another attorney stipulated
all of the elements of first degree murder plus two aggravating circumstances.'
The system of capital defense in America has operated in a constant
state of crisis since the resumption of capital litigation in the wake of Gregg
v. Georgia. 2 Professor White observes, "The states with the most executions
7.

466 U.S. 668 (1984).

8.

Id. at 688.

9.

Id. at 694.

10.

P. 3 (quoting Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State
JUST. SEC. 55) [hereinafter ABA Task Force].

Death Penalty Cases 1990 ABA CRIM.

11. P. 3 (quoting ABA Task Force, supra note 10, at 54).
12.

428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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have done the least to ensure that capital defendants are provided with effective representation at trial" (p. 4). Texas is a prime example; the hallmarks
of its indigent defense system are "inadequate structure for appointing attorneys for indigent capital defendants and inadequate pay for the attorneys
who are appointed" (pp. 4-5). Texas does not have a monopoly on incompetent capital defense; Professor White gives stark examples of inept
representation in Illinois, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi,
Louisiana, Missouri, and even California (pp. 5-10). In state after state, he
found examples of neglectful lawyers who were frequently appointed by the
court, perhaps because they would do little to obstruct a death verdict.' 3
Professor White explains that a significant obstacle to any solution is the
apparent indifference of public officials to the quality of defense in capital
cases. A reporter who watched defense attorney Joe Cannon sleep through
Carl Johnson's capital trial asked a Texas judge why the trial was allowed to
continue. The judge replied, "'The Constitution doesn't say the lawyer has
to be awake.' ,4 In 2001, six judges of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with him. The Court en banc barely mustered enough votes to grant
habeas corpus relief to Calvin Burdine, a Texas death row inmate defended
by Cannon, who "'repeatedly dozed and/or actually slept during substantial
portions of [Burdine's] capital murder trial .... Professor White provides other examples of capital defendants who were executed, even though
objective observers would agree that they were inadequately defended at
trial (p. 17). From these instances it is clear that Strickland has not adequately protected defendants on death row.
Professor White's concern that Strickland offers insufficient protection
against inadequate defense is grounded in research uncovering many cases
in which lawyers failed to search for mitigating evidence, often making
weak claims of "trial strategy," but where courts nevertheless relied on
Strickland to affirm capital convictions and sentences (p. 18-19). Although
Professor James Liebman's research demonstrates that many death row inmates have obtained relief under Strickland, 6 "lower courts in jurisdictions
with the most executions were least likely to grant relief' (p. 17). Such relief
is almost unheard of in Virginia and Texas (p. 18), although no one would
argue that those states provide the best defense lawyers.
Professor White suggests the fault lies in the Strickland standard itself,
which "did not have enough teeth to ensure that it would provide consistent
13. For instance, the California courts frequently appointed Ron Slick to defend indigents
because, unlike most other lawyers, he would not ask for a continuance to prepare for trial. P. 8.
14.
P. 6, n.36 (quoting Rick Casey, Lawyer Sleeps? Court: So what?, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS
NEWS, March 10, 2000, at 3A). In spite of his lawyer's drowsiness, Johnson was executed on September 19, 1995.
15.
Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citing Ex Parte Burdine,
901 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). In two dissenting opinions, six judges urged denial of
habeas relief under Strickland.
16.
See JAMES S. LIEBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN & VALERIE WEST, A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II:
WHY THERE IS So MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 11 (2002),
available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/report.pdf.
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protection to capital defendants or any incentive to states to impose stricter
standards for attorneys representing capital defendants" (p. 19). Further,
Professor White observes, "the Court's test [is]. .. too malleable to provide
adequate safeguards against unreliable results in capital cases" (p. 19). Professor White's criticism of Strickland focuses on the heavy deference to the
"strategic" decisions of trial counsel, and on the subjective determination of
whether the prisoner has met his burden of showing that his trial lawyer's
deficient performance affected the outcome of the case (pp. 17-19).
Professor White's criticism of Strickland is certainly valid. However, the
"competent performance" aspect of Strickland has also contributed to unfair
treatment of capital prisoners and warrants substantial discussion. Unfortunately, standards which impose specific duties on the part of capital defense
attorneys raise the issue of funding and resources, which have long been the
proverbial "elephant in the room" in discussions of capital defense standards. For example, in Parkus v. Bowersox, 7 trial counsel knew his client
had been institutionalized for most of his youth, but went to the wrong institution looking for records. When counsel was told there were no records on
his client, lack of time and resources forced him to trial without the benefit
of a complete investigation. Consequently, the jury was led to believe Parkus
was institutionalized for repeated acts of delinquency, when in reality he
was hospitalized for mental retardation, childhood schizophrenia, and to
protect him from his caretaker, who was a sadistic pedophile. Even though
the Court of Appeals had earlier ruled that such evidence may have affected
the outcome of Parkus's trial,'8 relief was denied under Strickland because
counsel performed reasonably given his limited time and resources. The
Supreme Court in Rompilla v. Beard'9 avoided the issue of adequate funding
in its opinion granting relief under Strickland, even though the lower court,
in an opinion written by then-Circuit Judge Samuel Alito, had denied relief
because the investigation had gone "far enough to leave counsel with reason
for thinking further efforts would not be a wise use of the limited resources
they had. ' 20 I would like to have heard Professor White's thoughts about the
proposition that a capital defense lawyer's obligation of competent performance is decreased in states that chronically under-fund indigent defense.
In spite of the discouraging state of capital representation in America,
Professor White's innate optimism illuminates a hopeful future. While
courts and political institutions have been indifferent to the obligation to
provide competent capital defense, "[o]ver the past fifteen years, the ABA
has made a concerted effort to improve the quality of representation afforded capital defendants" (p. 3), primarily through the promulgation of
detailed performance guidelines for attorneys representing capital defendants. Where the ABA has led, the Supreme Court may follow. Professor

17.

157 F.3d 1136 (8th Cir. 1998).

18.

Parkus v. Delo, 33 E3d 933 (8th Cir. 1994).

19.

545 U.S. 374 (2005).

20.

545 U.S. at 379.
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White sees hope in two recent decisions:. Wiggins v. Smith" and Williams v.
Taylor.22 This review will discuss those cases and what the effective assistance of counsel means generally in Part II.

II.

EXHAUSTIVE INVESTIGATION: AN INDISPENSABLE
ELEMENT OF EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION

While Professor White's analysis of the Strickland standard is insightful,
his compelling narrative of trial and postconviction cases handled by dedicated capital defense lawyers has the potential to be even more influential.
He sees a wide performance gap between experienced criminal defense attorneys and experienced capital defense attorneys, who have a superior
understanding of the decision-making tendencies of capital juries and the
importance of exhaustive investigation. He shows numerous examples of
dedicated lawyers avoiding their client's execution through diligent investigation, teamwork, and thoughtful planning. This investigation and planning
is truly what separates the effective lawyers from the ineffective.
Section A discusses Professor White's illustration of innocent persons
sentenced to death row after trial counsel failed to conduct the exhaustive
investigation necessary to defend a death penalty case. Section B details
how these investigations can make a difference in even the most aggravated
of cases, and the lengths to which dedicated attorneys will go to complete a
full investigation. Section C considers plea bargaining as a way that experienced capital defenders prevent their clients from facing the death penalty in
the first instance. Finally, Section D describes experienced capital appellate
lawyers and the formidable procedural obstacles facing capital prisoners in
postconviction proceedings.
A. Innocence on Death Row
Professor White devotes much of his book to the issue of innocence,
pointing out many ways in which factors unique to death penalty cases undermine the reliability of death judgments. The prospect that an innocent
person could be (or has been) executed in the United States has been prominent in the death penalty debate, particularly in light of the number of
people released from prison after new evidence established successful
claims of actual innocence." Professor White provides specific references to

21.

539 U.S. 510 (2003).

22.

529 U.S. 362 (2000).

23.
Pp. 37-41 (discussing 119 cases of death row inmates released based upon evidence of
innocence). Since the publication of Professor White's book, that list has grown to 123 with the
release of Derrick Jamison, Harold Wilson, and John Ballard. Ernest Willis, discussed at 55-63, is
listed as exoneration number 120. See Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence: List of Those
Freed from Death Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orglarticle.php?scid=6&did=l 10 (last visited
July 12, 2006).
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the positions of both sides of the debate,24 pointing out that while there may

be some guilty persons among those released from death row, "there is also
substantial reason to believe that other death row defendants who have not
been exonerated are in fact not guilty of the capital offenses for which they

were convicted" (p. 41). To illustrate his point, Professor White provides
detailed accounts of the wrongful conviction and exoneration of Earl Washington, Jr.,2' Anthony Porter,26 Earnest Willis, 27 and Joseph Amrine. 8 Each of
these men spent over seventeen years on death row before proof of their
innocence set them free. These stories call to mind Bryan Stevenson's com-

ment after winning the freedom of his innocent client, former Alabama
death row inmate Walter MacMillian: "It was too easy for the state to con-

vict someone for that crime and then have him sentenced to death. And it
was too hard in light of the evidence of his innocence to show this court that
he should never have been here in the first place. 29

24. The detailed footnotes in Professor White's book are characteristic of his work, as remembered by his colleague, Pitt Law Professor Ronald Brand:
Just two days before White's death, Brand remembers visiting him. Though he was bed-ridden
and uncomfortable, he was elated by the fact that he had a copy of his new book. White asked
Brand to read it to him. After beginning, he warned that he wouldn't take the time to read the
footnotes, but White insisted. This need for specificity was inherent in White.
"You see, when he did anything, he did it completely and he did it in detail," Brand said. "His
footnotes were both important and human. And in anything he did, he wanted to understand it
completely."
Remizowski, supra note 4.
25. Pp. 42-49. Virginia Govemor James Gilmore granted Washington a full pardon on October 2, 2000. P. 49.
26. Pp. 50-55. Porter's exoneration was an important factor in Governor George Ryan's
historic decision in January, 2000, to suspend executions in Illinois. "'How do you prevent another
Anthony Porter...?' he asked. 'Today I cannot answer that question."' P. 55.
27. Pp. 55-50. The district attorney who portrayed Willis as "a cold blooded monster, devoid
of empathy or feelings of any kind," p. 57, eventually dismissed all charges against Willis, explaining, "'[hie simply did not do the crime.... I'm sorry this man was on death row for so long and
there were so many lost years,"' p. 65.
28. Pp. 189-93. Amrine's case is particularly disturbing. In seeking to carry out Amrine's
execution in spite of the new evidence of his innocence, the Missouri Attorney General argued before the Missouri Supreme Court that the execution of an innocent person is not a manifest injustice:
JUDGE STITH: Are you suggesting if we don't find there's a constitutional violation and if
even we find that Mr. Amrine is actually innocent, he should be executed? . . I'm asking is
that what you are arguing for the State?
A'TORNEY GENERAL: That's correct, Your Honor.
P. 192 (quoting Audio Recording: Missouri Oral Arguments on Archive, State ex rel. Amrine v.
Luebbers, 102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. Feb. 4, 2003) (No. SC 84656), at http://www.missourinet.coml
gestalt/go.cfm?objectid=03AICA5A-94A2-4ADD-866448549D08DD74%category=6%5EMissouri
%20Supreme%20Court%20Argument. Professor White points out that although the attorney general's argument "seems absurd and illogical, contrary authority is scant." P. 194.
29.

Man freed after spending six years on Alabama's death row, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,

Mar. 3, 1993, at 6A.
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1. The Investigations
Reflecting on these cases, Professor White observes that "the circumstances that led to the defendant's exoneration were extraordinarily
adventitious" (p. 65). Earl Washington came within three weeks of execution before a New York law firm, at the behest of former death row inmate
Joe Giarratano, took up his cause (pp. 47, 65). The investigation that freed
Anthony Porter occurred only because journalism students happened to take
an interest in the case (pp. 53-55). In Willis's arson-murder case, "the catalyst that precipitated the massive investigation that resulted in Willis's
exoneration" was the fortuitous "confession" by inmate David Long that, in
retrospect, "was very likely false" (pp. 65-66). The investigation prompted
by Long's confession turned up physical evidence that convinced even the
prosecuting attorney that the fire "probably wasn't caused by arson at all
.... most likely [it] 'was
caused by an electrical problem-a broken ceiling
30
fan or a faulty outlet.
These cases provide an informative backdrop for Professor White's discussion of the sources of error in capital cases, including false confessions
(pp. 66-67), mistaken forensic testimony (pp. 66-68), mistaken identification (p. 68), and a dynamic called "'the prosecution complex'-where
overzealous police or prosecutors prematurely become convinced they have
the right suspect and become narrowly focused on strengthening the case
against that suspect" (p. 68). Professor White quotes a chilling statement
attributed to a Texas prosecutor that "any prosecutor can convict a guilty
man. It takes a great prosecutor to convict an innocent man."'" Such attitudes
lend credence to Professor White's conclusion that "the execution of an innocent defendant has probably already occurred and, in any event, is
inevitable. 32 This most certainly illustrates that "there are fundamental
problems with our system of capital punishment" (p. 203).
Professor White notes that the defense attorneys in the Washington, Porter, and Willis trials appeared to have good reputations. These lawyers "do
not fit within the category of capital defense attorneys characterized by the

30. P. 65 (quoting Scott Gold & Liane Hart, The Nation: Inmate Freed After 17 Years; Prosecutors Once Called Him a "Satanic Demon"; but Fatal Fire Probably Wasn't Even Arson, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2004, at A14).
31.

P. 71 (quoting WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH

PENALTY

IN THE '90's 42 (1991)).

32. P. 203. Since Professor White's book went to print, in at least four cases, posthumous investigations strongly suggest that innocent persons were executed, including two in which the prosecution
has reopened the investigation of the original homicide. Larry Griffin was executed in Missouri on June
21, 1995. Terry Ganey, Case Is Reopened 10 Years after Man Was Executed, ST. Louts POST-DISPATCH,
July 12, 2005, at Al. Ruben Cantu was executed in Texas in 1993. Lise Olsen, The Cantu Case: Death
And Doubt: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 21, 2005, at A1, available
at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/3472872.html (Last visited July 13, 2006).
Carlos de Luna was executed in Texas in 1989. See Maurice Possley & Steven Mills, "1 Didn't Do
It, But I Know Who Did": New Evidence Suggests a 1989 Execution in Texas Was a Case of Mistaken Identity, Cm. TRIB., June 25, 2006, at 20 available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
specials/chi-tx-l-story,0,4563517.htmlstory (last visited July 13, 2006). Cameron Willingham was
executed in Texas in 2004. Howard Witt, Texas Urged to Probe Claims of Wrongful Executions, CHI.
TRIB., July 7, 2006, at 6.
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ABA as 'abysmal' or 'deplorable'" (p. 71). Nevertheless, the defenses in
those cases produced death sentences against innocent clients (pp. 71-73).
Lawyers without capital defense training and experience simply fail to ap-

preciate the many ways in which death cases are different, and thus fail to
adopt investigative, preparation, and trial methods that account for those
differences.33 Because there are many aspects of the current system of capital punishment that are stacked against capital defendants, the defense
lawyer is the only person standing between innocent clients and the executioner.
2. No Strategy About It: Investigating MitigatingEvidence
Experienced capital defense attorneys understand that one of the ironies
of death penalty litigation is that defendants who claim innocence are at a
greater risk of being sentenced to death than a defendant whose guilt is obvious.3 4 Capital defendants claiming innocence often discourage their
lawyers from investigating sentencing issues, believing that it will diminish
their chances of being acquitted; meanwhile, attorneys without capital experience often misjudge the likelihood of success and acquiesce to the client's
wishes.35 "Paradoxically, a capital defendant's strong claim of innocence thus
sometimes creates a trap for unwary defense counsel that, if not avoided, will
increase the likelihood of the defendant's execution. 3 6 Indeed, Professor
White's research revealed that experienced capital defense attorneys approach
this difficult situation very differently than other criminal defense lawyers.
Inexperienced capital lawyers, even those with substantial criminal defense experience, will often "talk themselves into thinking they don't have
to worry about the penalty phase because they have a great shot of winning
the case. 37 Such lawyers will often "place undue emphasis on securing a
favorable verdict at the defendant's guilt trial, thereby jeopardizing his
chances at the penalty trial" (p. 101). Inexperienced attorneys typically will
33.

Some of those differences are discussed in Section II.A.2.

34. See Steven P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors
Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538 (1998) (acceptance of responsibility and remorse are highly mitigating); Scott E. Sundby, The Jury and Absolution: Trial Tactics, Remorse and the Death Penalty, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1557 (1998) (denial defense more than twice as likely to result in death sentence,
compared to admission of responsibility cases).
35. A claim of innocence can be a source of distrust between a capital defendant and his
lawyer; the client may feel that "ti]f you are preparing for the penalty trial, that means you don't
believe I am innocent. If you don't trust me when I tell you I'm innocent, I don't trust you to represent me when my life is at stake." P. 78 (quoting an e-mail from Michael Millman to White).
36. P. 101. Professor White found another "perverse effect" of the death penalty related to
innocence: a defendant who is truly innocent "will be more likely to reject any government offers to
plea bargain." P. 169. However, experience shows that "just because the defendant is innocent of the
capital crime does not mean the jury will acquit him." P. 169 (citing discussion at 37-42). Therefore,
"[c]apital defendants who are guilty are ... more likely to avoid the death sentence through a plea
bargain; on the other hand, those who are innocent are more likely to be subjected to the vagariesand potential mistakes--of a trial by jury." P. 169.
37. P. 78 (quoting White's telephone interview with Michael Burt, Federal Death Penalty
Resource Counselor).
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"grossly underestimate the difficulty in convincing a death-qualified jury
that there is a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt," failing to appreciate that "death-qualified juries ... are thus much more likely than other

juries to credit the prosecution's evidence and less likely to acquit the
defendant or find him guilty of a lesser [i.e. non-capital] offense. 38 Further,
persisting in claiming innocence in the face of a guilty verdict is likely to be
"counterproductive" because the jury may interpret such arguments as "the
defendant's failure to accept responsibility for his actions [as] a consideration
that argues in favor of imposing the death penalty" (p. 101). Therefore, "even
able and experienced criminal defense attorneys who lack experience in capital cases may fail to prepare for the penalty trial because they are confident
that there will be a favorable outcome at the guilt trial" (pp. 78-79).
Specialists in capital litigation "unequivocally reject this approach. Because they are aware that even defendants with very strong claims of
innocence may be convicted of the capital offense, these attorneys insist that
a lawyer representing a capital defendant should always prepare for the penalty trial."3 9 Experienced capital attorneys are also more acutely aware that

the penalty phase becomes a more difficult undertaking when a defendant is
convicted of a capital crime in spite of his claim of innocence. Deathqualified jurors may feel that an argument "that there is still a lingering
doubt as to guilt is disrespectful to the jury in the sense that it challenges the
legitimacy of their recently returned verdict" (p. 82). Such jurors are also
"significantly less likely than the normal population to perceive a lingering
doubt, or any kind of doubt, as to a criminal defendant's guilt. In addition,
members of any jury may believe that, once the jury had returned a guilty
verdict, that verdict resolves all possible doubts against the defendant" (pp.
81-82). An argument that the jury's verdict was mistaken could be interpreted by the jury as disrespectful to its verdict, or worse, as lack of remorse
on the part of the defendant (p. 101). It is extremely risky, therefore, to argue in the penalty phase that the jury's guilt-phase verdict could be wrong.40
The type of mitigating evidence that might be persuasive to a juror who
has rejected an innocence claim presents yet another dilemma. The most
frequent type of evidence presented in a capital sentencing trial relates to

38. P. 78. A death-qualified jury is one selected by eliminating people whose views on the
death penalty substantially impair their willingness to impose it. Although the Supreme Court has
upheld the constitutionality of the procedure, the underlying research demonstrating the biasing
effect of death qualification is persuasive. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd
sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
39. P. 79. See ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 10.10.1 (Rev. 2003) [hereinafter ABA GUIDELINES] ("As the
investigations mandated by Guideline 10.7 produce information, trial counsel should formulate a
defense theory. Counsel should seek a theory that will be effective in connection with both guilt and
penalty, and should seek to minimize any inconsistencies.").
40. In spite of this caveat, Professor White provides several examples of arguments by experienced capital attorneys, including David Bruck, Steven Bright, and Michael Burt, who skillfully
and successfully presented lingering doubts of their client's guilt as a persuasive reason to spare his
life. Pp. 85-100. Any attorney confronted with this difficult dilemma would find inspiration on those
pages.
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"the defendant's troubled childhood and impaired mental health" (p. 83). If
such evidence can be interpreted as an explanation for violent behavior on
the defendant's part, "the jury may feel that the defense attorney should
have presented this evidence at the guilt stage rather than asserting a claim
of innocence without providing the jury information that would have helped
the jury assess that claim" (p. 83). Therefore, if the defendant has presented
a strong claim of innocence at the guilt stage, experienced capital defense
attorneys "will be less likely to introduce mitigating evidence designed to
explain why the defendant committed the crime [because] it may lead the
jury to view the defense as disingenuous" (p. 83).
Experienced capital defense attorneys will base strategic decisions on a
thorough investigation of the defendant's life history. In some cases, the defense may present "'good guy' evidence, such as the defendant's good
character, good employment record," or other testimony indicating that the
defendant is not aggressive and need not be executed to protect society (p.
83). Indeed, some attorneys reported that jurors in the penalty phase asked if
they could change their guilty verdict after hearing "good guy" mitigating
evidence (p. 84).
In many cases in which the defendant has maintained his innocence during the guilt trial, "good guy" mitigating evidence may be lacking, or
intermingled with evidence of behavior attributable to severe mental impairments or "'a profoundly troubled childhood in which the defendant was
subjected to horrendous abuse and profound neglect"' (p. 84). Attorneys
without substantial capital experience may reject such "double-edged" evidence because while it may cause them to empathize with the defendant, it
may also eliminate any lingering doubts about his guilt, making jurors more
concerned "that sparing his life will enhance the danger to society, a consideration that empirical data indicates will weigh heavily in the penalty jury's
decision" (p. 84).
In spite of this dilemma, "experienced capital defense attorneys invariably conclude that mitigating evidence must be presented, even if there is
some chance that the jury may view it as double-edged. 4 ' Steve Bright, one
of the most experienced capital trial lawyers in the country, states that counsel must "always present mitigating evidence that will explain the
defendant's background and history to the jury, thereby enabling the jury to
gain an understanding of the defendant as a person" (p. 85).
The disparity between how an experienced capital defender will prepare
to argue innocence and how a typical defender will prepare demonstrates
that substantial reforms are necessary to prevent the execution of more innocent defendants. There are signs, however, that the Court is becoming less
tolerant of lawyers who rely on clients' claims of innocence
to justify the
• 42
failure to investigate penalty issues. In Wiggins v. Smith, the Court found
41.
P. 85. See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (finding that the doubleedged nature of mitigation evidence did not justify trial counsel's failure to investigate and present
mitigation).
42.

539 U.S. 510 (2003).
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to investigate mitigating evidence, rejectrationalize their failure to investigate
Wiggins was innocent. The Court had
as an excuse for trial counsels' failure to

investigate.43

Professor White hopes that Wiggins v. Smith will "dramatically expand a
capital defendant's attorney's obligation to investigate mitigating evidence
in preparing for the penalty trial" (p. 19). The Court specifically observed
that "[t]he ABA Guidelines provide that investigations into mitigating evidence 'should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available
mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that
may be introduced by the prosecutor." '
Professor White believes the Court should go even further and recognize
that "[t]he practices of skilled capital defense attorneys indicate that these
attorneys will rarely, if ever, decide to curtail investigation for mitigating
evidence for any reason" (p. 200). Even when mitigating evidence includes
facts that show the defendant may have violent tendencies, skilled defense
attorneys nevertheless present such evidence "in order to provide the jury
with a fuller understanding of the defendant's personal history and the
forces that have shaped his conduct" (p. 200). Based on his study of skilled
capital defense attorneys, Professor White concludes that "[c]ourts should
interpret Wiggins to mean that, in the absence of very unusual circumstances, a capital defendant's attorney needs to conduct a full investigation
for mitigating evidence in order to make a fully informed decision as to the
strategy to be adopted at the penalty trial" (p. 200). Potentially innocent defendants are just as deserving of a vigorous sentencing-phase defense as
those who are clearly guilty. Indeed, given the ever-increasing restrictions
on capital appeals, an effective penalty phase defense may be necessary to
the defendant's ability to prove his innocence at some future proceeding.
B. LitigatingAggravated Cases

Professor White provides examples of experienced capital defense lawyers avoiding the death penalty in three highly aggravated cases: John Lee
Malvo, accused of nine Washington, D.C., area sniper homicides in October
2002; William White, an ex-convict charged in California with two homicides that involved torture and sexual assault; and Martin Gonzales, a
defendant with a previous murder conviction accused of beating three
women to death in Texas. His narrative provides more support for his assertion that Wiggins v. Smith41 should be more rigorously enforced. Professor
White purposely chose these cases because each involved the type of murder
about which prosecutors commonly say, "'If this isn't a death penalty case,
43.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 395.

44.

539 U.S. at 524 (quoting ABA

45.

539 U.S. 510 (2003).

GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE
OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 11.4.1(C) (1989)).
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we might as well repeal the death penalty statute'" (p. 105). Yet in each
case, defense attorneys diligently investigated the case and developed a
case-specific "theme for life that was strong enough to convince the jury
that, despite the aggravated nature of the case, the death penalty should not
be imposed" (p. 109).
Professor White uses these cases to make his point that a diligent defense can avoid the death penalty even in exceptionally aggravated cases.
The reader will be most familiar with the "Beltway Sniper" case, in which
John Lee Malvo was charged in the series of shootings that killed nine people and wounded three in Maryland, the District of Columbia, and Virginia
in October 2002. Malvo, the alleged triggerman, was accused of conspiring
with John Allen Muhammad, his forty-one-year-old mentor (p. 110). Attorney General John Ashcroft decided that Malvo should be tried in Virginia
because the laws of that state were the most conducive to obtaining and carrying out a sentence of death.46 In spite of Malvo's youth, the death penalty
seemed almost inevitable given the number of victims and Malvo's confession in which he "claim[ed] to be the trigger man in each of the Washington
,4
area's 13 sniper shootings.. ., saying 'I intended to kill them all.'
Professor White details how Malvo's attorneys, Craig Cooley and Michael Arif, convinced the jury to spare Malvo from execution by developing
a powerful theme for life through the testimony of more than sixty witnesses. The defense presented evidence of Malvo's impoverished childhood
in Jamaica, where his mother, Una James, "'beat him regularly with her
hands and with sticks and belts,'" and abandoned him for months at time.48
Malvo's teachers and caretakers used a Jamaican folk expression to describe
James's approach to child rearing: "'Punish this child, save the eye'
(p. 112). In other words, beat the child severely, but stop short of crippling
or killing him. Caretakers described Malvo "as a gentle, vulnerable youth
who was desperate for a father or for a parent of any kind" (p. 113). Muhammed provided that father figure for him just as Malvo was left alone in
Antigua for three months "with virtually nothing. 'He was living in a shack
that had no electricity and no running water.' ,49 Muhammad's twenty-oneyear-old son, Lindbergh Williams, described his father as manipulative and
skillful at exploiting weakness, (p. 113) and told the jury, "If my mother had
not been a strong woman, if my mother had not fought for me, then it would
have been me rather than Lee Malvo in that car with John Muhammad in
October of 2002." 50

46. Malvo was only seventeen years of age, making him ineligible for the death penalty
under Maryland and federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (2000); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW, § 2-202
(West 2002). The District of Columbia has no death penalty.
47.
P. 110 (quoting S.A. Miller, Malvo: "I intended to kill them all"; Prosecutorsplay sniper
tape, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at A 1).

48.

P. 112 (citing Tom Jackman, Malvo Said Confession to Police Was a Lie, Psychologist

Tells Court, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2003, at Al).

49.

P. 113 (quoting a phone interview with Craig Cooley (Feb. 2, 2004)).

50.

P. 113 (quoting Cooley interview, supra note 49).
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Although the jury convicted Malvo of capital murder, they spared his
life after hearing penalty phase testimony, which "emphasized Malvo's positive characteristics, including his intelligence and gentleness, as well as his
need for a father figure and his susceptibility to indoctrination" (p. 117).
Defense counsel concluded his plea for Malvo's life by telling the jury that
"they were 'in a very real sense' becoming 'the last of the very long line of
care takers.' ,,51Cooley then returned to his original theme: "I leave you with
a phrase. It's a phrase that both invites you to mete punishment out, but also
to temper it, to draw the line short of the ultimate penalty ... Punish this
child, save the eye" (p. 120). Notwithstanding Malvo's terrible crime, the
jury returned with a unanimous vote for life.
Professor White's retelling of the Malvo defense demonstrates his point
that a defense conducted in compliance with the ABA Guidelines can produce a life sentence even in highly aggravated cases. To further illustrate his
point, Professor White provides narratives of two additional highly aggravated death penalty cases involving defendants not as youthful as Malvo.
Michael Burt and Robert Berman's successful defense of William White,
who was charged with two homicides involving torture and sexual deviance,
is another example of a painstaking investigation resulting in a persuasive
case for mercy. The defense themes focused on White's tragic childhood of
abuse and neglect, followed by his successful adaptation to prison, where he
was a "'calming influence' on other prisoners," and had even saved a guard
from being stabbed (p. 127). in spite of White's terrible crimes, Burt and
Berman convinced a jury that "his life was worth saving" (p. 129).
Professor White draws several conclusions from these cases. A competent capital defense attorney, working with a mitigation specialist, will
conduct "a full investigation that will allow the defense team to identify
possible mitigating factors," (p. 105) and develop a case-specific "theme for
life" that tells a "coherent story" which explains the defendant's "life to a
jury the way one would relate facts to a neighbor or friend" (p. 106). Capital
defense attorneys, wherever possible, rely on lay witnesses and documentary and demonstrative evidence, in addition to expert witnesses who can
demonstrate for the jury in a persuasive way the defendant's mental impairments, disorders, or limitations, or who may demonstrate the defendant's
capacity for "rehabilitation or ability to lead a productive life in prison.""
Experienced capital defense attorneys will "seek to articulate and to offer
evidence in support of the defense's theme for life as early and as often as
possible" during the trial (p. 107).
51.
P. 120 (quoting fax from Craig Cooley to author, Defense Counsel's Closing Argument
during Penalty Phase of Malvo Trial 2 (Feb. 10, 1994)).
52. P. 106 (citing S. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CASE EXAMPLE: PRESENTING A THEME
THROUGHOUT THE CASE 6-7). For example, in Malvo's case, in addition to lay witnesses, the defense called psychologist Dewey Comell, who testified that Muhammad had brainwashed Malvo to
participate in his sniper plan, and Neil Boothby, "a recipient of the humanitarian award from the
Red Cross for his work with child soldiers from third world countries." P. 115. Boothby "explained
how adults train children to be soldiers and why children are especially susceptible to this kind of
training." P. 115, n.42. It is clear, however, that the anecdotal material provided by lay witnesses
formed the core of the defense theme for life.
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The defense lawyers' in-court strategy, however, is not the entire story.
One limitation of Professor White's book is his tendency to focus on the
courtroom execution of the defense trial strategy, without a detailed discussion of the investigation that preceded the trial. The reader must infer from
the description of each case the thousands of hours of investigation that enabled the defense to develop a compelling theme for life. The reader would
benefit from hearing about the Malvo defense team's travels to Jamaica and
the Pacific Northwest to trace their client's life history, find Malvo's teachers and caretakers, and bring them to Virginia. It would also be interesting to
hear how the defense team selected the experts who helped explain the effectiveness of Muhammad's conditioning of Malvo, and how the defense
attorneys were able to obtain such resources in a state known for its failure
to adequately fund capital defense. Equally enlightening would be a description of the defense team's investigation into William White's life history,
and how they approached interviews with White's sister, who agreed to testify to the horrible abuse to which she and her brother were subjected. 3
In glossing over the pretrial preparation part of these stories, Professor
White misses perhaps the most important difference between capital defense
lawyers and less dedicated or experienced defense attorneys: the capital defense bar will always reach out for help and advice from multiple sources,
just as Malvo's lawyers did with the Red Cross volunteer, to unearth sources
of human compassion in their cases. Of course, that level of detail would
undoubtedly add hundreds of pages to this short and very readable work.
Nevertheless, it would be helpful to emphasize that successful capital defense attorneys work with co-counsel, mitigation specialists, investigators,
and experts in advance of trial, and to describe in more detail the successful
investigation that uncovered the compelling mitigating evidence and themes
that prompted death-qualified juries to reject the death penalty for defendants found guilty of aggravated murders.
Professor White's accounts of cases in which diligent lawyers persuaded
jurors to spare the life of defendants found guilty of exceptionally violent
homicides vindicates the Court's analysis in Williams v. Taylor.54 Professor
White suggests that Williams "could alter the way in which courts apply
Strickland's prejudice prong in capital cases" (p. 9). Williams, though providing few guidelines for lower courts attempting to apply Strickland,
nevertheless makes it clear that a condemned prisoner can prove that he was
prejudiced by his lawyer's poor performance even in cases in which "the
government establishes significant aggravating circumstances" (p. 34). Professor White's discussion of the Malvo and Williams cases demonstrates
that the defense counsel's performance, not the government's case in
53.

Professor White gives a brief synopsis of her testimony:

William had three sisters. His father would hang all four children from the rafters, beat them

with a belt, and then pour salt in their wounds to increase their pain. In addition, William had
to watch his father rape and abuse his three sisters .... [A]pparently for no other reason than
that he knew William loved his pet, Mr. White had [William's] dog put to death. P. 124.
54.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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aggravation, is the appropriate focus of an ineffective assistance of counsel
inquiry. Professor White also sees hope in Wiggins v. Smith that the Court
will enforce counsel's obligation to conduct reasonable investigations and
scrutinize claims of "strategy" that are not based on thorough investigations.
By providing details about the investigation overseen by the experienced
death penalty defense attorneys in the Malvo and Williams cases, Professor
White could have shown how teamwork is a core component of a competent
capital defense, and that mitigation specialists are an indispensable part of
that team. 5 The Court's more recent decision in Rompilla v. Beard 6 is a
good illustration of this point. Rompilla was defended by two courtappointed lawyers who consulted three mental health experts and interviewed five members of Rompilla's immediate family. Nevertheless, they
were able to produce little mitigating evidence for the jury. Rompilla himself was not interested in assisting with a mitigation defense, and his family
apparently led counsel to believe that there was nothing significant about his
childhood. Postconviction counsel subsequently reviewed the files of Rompilla's prior conviction, which the prosecution used in aggravation of
punishment, and discovered evidence which led to substantial, compelling
mitigation. Rompilla's parents were "severe alcoholics who drank constantly," and his father beat him "with his hands, fists, leather straps, belts
and sticks." 7 Rompilla and his brother were caged "in a small wire mesh
dog pen that was filthy and excrement filled.' 5 8 Postconviction counsel also
found documentary evidence from Rompilla's childhood establishing that he
had mental retardation, probably connected with fetal alcohol syndrome
caused by his mother's drinking during pregnancy. The Court granted relief
under the Strickland standard because reasonably competent trial counsel
would have reviewed the file of Rompilla's prior conviction and discovered
a mental evaluation that referred to some of these mitigating facts. 9
The deprived and terror-filled childhoods described in the cases of
Rompilla, Taylor, Wiggins, Malvo, and Williams are not unusual in individuals who experience violent outbursts that produce capital crimes. Yet
experienced capital defense attorneys understand that there are many obstacles that make it difficult for clients and their families to disclose such facts.
Abuse, neglect, and mental illness are often associated with events or conditions considered humiliating or shameful, and thus become closely guarded
family secrets. More often than not, defense lawyers come from a different
cultural background than the client and his family, making trust and com-

55. Guideline 4.1 provides that "[t]he defense team should consist of no fewer than two
attorneys qualified in accordance with Guideline 5.1, an investigator, and a mitigation specialist."
ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 28. Further, the defense team must include "at least one member qualified by training and experience to screen individuals for the presence of mental or
psychological disorders or impairments." Id.
56.

545 U.S. 374 (2005).

57.

Id. at 391-92.

58.

Id. at 392.

59.

Id. at 393.

April 2007]

Capital Defense Lawyers

1083

munication even more difficult. As amply demonstrated by Rompilla, investigation limited to trial counsel interviewing family members and calling in
mental health experts for generic consultations will not uncover the facts
most pertinent to the jury's life-or-death decision. It would have been
enlightening for Professor White to expand his discussion of these cases to
include the substantial contributions of non-lawyer members of the successful defense teams.
C. Plea Bargaining:Taking Death Off the Table
Because the best capital trial lawyers are adept at avoiding the death
penalty through negotiation, Professor White devotes an entire chapter to
plea-bargaining (chapter six). Experienced capital defense attorneys "have
long understood that aggressively seeking negotiated resolutions in capital
cases is a vital aspect of effective representation" (p. 145). Millard Farmer, a
Georgia capital defense attorney, "estimates that 75 percent of the defendants who have been executed since 1976 could have avoided the death
sentence by accepting a plea offer" (p. 145). Other experienced attorneys
estimate that over half of the defendants who have been executed had an
opportunity to enter a guilty plea to a sentence other than death (p. 146).
Skilled capital defense attorneys will therefore pursue negotiated settlements that avoid the death penalty.
Professor White discusses cases in which skilled attorneys found alternatives to execution that served the interests of the state and even the
victim's survivors. These cases illustrate that experienced capital attorneys
do not passively await plea offers from the prosecution and present them
indifferently to the client; they diligently and creatively pursue negotiated
settlements.
While plea bargaining is "an important weapon that may be used to save
clients' lives," Professor White also finds it "exacerbates a well-documented
weakness of the death penalty: its arbitrary application" (p. 168). Factors
which had nothing to do with the magnitude of the defendant's crime, "such
as the time and place where the crime was committed, the victim's characteristics, [and] the effectiveness of the defendant's lawyer," have a
significant effect on the likelihood that the defendant will receive a death
sentence (p. 168; footnote omitted).
Plea-bargaining contributes to the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty by allowing the guilty to escape death but exposing the innocent to the
risks of trial by jury.60 While prosecutors may support the death penalty because of the significant advantage it gives the government in plea
negotiations, there are documented instances in which innocent persons
have pled guilty to avoid the death penalty. In Missouri, for example,
Johnny Lee Wilson's attorneys convinced him to plead guilty to a murder he

60. P. 169. See supra Section II.A.1 (discussing the risks of arguing innocence to a deathqualified jury).
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did not commit in order to avoid the death penalty.6' Lloyd Schlup, after a
court found that he was probably innocent of the murder for which he was
sentenced to death, 62 pled guilty to a reduced charge rather than risk returning to death row.63 I sat with Schlup in the death watch cell in Potosi
Correctional Center when he came within a few hours of execution, and the
terror of that experience was the pivotal factor in his decision to accept a
plea offer that would make him immediately eligible for parole. It was as if
the prosecution were allowed to negotiate a settlement while holding a gun
to Schlup's head.
D. PostconvictionLitigation
Finally, Professor White examines representation of death row inmates
in postconviction proceedings seeking to set aside a capital conviction or
sentence. He begins his discussion with Professor Liebman's exhaustive
survey of post-Furmancapital sentences which revealed that courts have set
aside sixty-eight percent of the death sentences imposed between 1976 and
1995. 6 Regardless of the historically high rate of success, obstacles confronted by lawyers and their clients in these cases are formidable. In 1996,
Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA"), which limited the power of federal courts to review stateimposed convictions and sentences (pp. 173-80). Since then, the rate at
which capital prisoners are being
denied habeas corpus relief on procedural
•65
grounds has steadily increased. Even before AEDPA, however, "The
Rehnquist Court established significant barriers to obtaining federal habeas
relief in the 1970s and 1980s" (p. 177).
One of the significant barriers that capital prisoners face in postconviction proceedings is that the indigent defense system in capital
postconviction cases is even more strained than at the trial level. Most capital jurisdictions depend upon inexperienced lawyers with meager resources,
and in 1995 Congress terminated funding for Capital Punishment Resource
Centers which trained and assisted those lawyers (pp. 175-76). The Supreme Court's decision in Coleman v. Thompson,66 which deprives prisoners
of any remedy if their court-appointed postconviction counsel commits malpractice, exacerbates the harmful effect of bad lawyering in postconviction

61.
Terry Ganey, Pardoned Man Wants to "Pick Up My Life", ST. Louis
Sept. 30, 1995, at IA.
62.

POST-DIsPATCH,

Schlup v. Delo, 912 E Supp. 448,450-51 (E.D. Mo. 1995).

63. See Death Penalty Information Center, Released From Death Row, Probable or Possible
Innocence http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=6&did=l 1l#Released (last visited July
29, 2006).
64.
65.
(2006).

P. 173 (citing

LIEBMAN ET AL.,

supra note 16, at 11).

John H. Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype" and the "Bite", 91

CORNELL

L. REV. 259, 288-97

66. 501 U.S. 722 (1991). See also Murray v. Giarratano, 429 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that
there is no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings).
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proceedings. 6 Therefore, a postconviction lawyer can erect procedural barriers to federal habeas corpus review even in compelling cases of
constitutional violation.6 s
Professor White's discussion of Ricky Zeitvogel provides a stark example of the impact of Coleman v. Thompson and Murray v. Giarratano.
Zeitvogel, a prisoner in the Missouri State Penitentiary, was convicted of
capital murder and sentenced to death in the death of fellow inmate Gary
"Crazy" Dew. Missouri Public Defender Julian Ossman, another attorney
known for his inept defense in capital cases, defended Zeitvogel. 69 Ossman
did not tell the jury that Zeitvogel had been a confidential informant in a
pending prosecution of Dew for attempted murder, even though Ossman
knew this, as he had defended Dew on that charge, and had given Dew a
copy of Zeitvogel's statement (p. 186). Although this information was very
probative of Zeitvogel's claim of self defense, Coleman v. Thompson caused
his claim to be procedurally barred because his postconviction counsel never
pursued the evidence, in spite of Zeitvogel's repeated requests. Thus, Zeitvogel was executed because his postconviction lawyer's inept performance
white-washed the disloyalty and incompetence of his trial attorney.
Defenders of the current system of capital appeals often claim that it offers capital prisoners one fair bite at the apple. Professor White points out
the fallacy of that assumption after Coleman v. Thompson: "If a capital defendant has a knowledgeable state postconviction attorney who will fully
investigate and accurately allege his constitutional claims, the defendant will
get two bites at the apple; his postconviction claims will be considered by
both the state and federal courts" (p. 194). On the other hand, if the state
postconviction attorney does not adequately preserve his claims, "he is
likely to get no bites at all; as Zeitvogel's case demonstrates, even if he has
good constitutional claims, they will probably not be considered by either
the state or federal courts" (p. 194). A capital prisoner gets two bites at the
apple or no bites; nobody gets just one.
This dynamic explains why Professor Liebman found regional patterns
of relatively poor success of capital prisoners in federal habeas proceedings:
the most active death rows are in states with historically poor records of
providing competent counsel to capital defendants.70 By providing equally
poor representation in postconviction proceedings, those states disable
67. In Coleman, court-appointed postconviction counsel filed a notice of appeal from an
order denying postconviction relief one day late, resulting in the dismissal of Roger Coleman's
appeal on procedural grounds.
68. For a compelling argument that Coleman was wrongly decided and should be overruled,
see Eric M. Freedman, GiarratanoIs a Scarecrow: The Right to Counsel in State Capital Postconviction Proceedings,91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079 (2006).
69. Two of Ossman's other clients, Joe Amrine and Eric Clemmons, were convicted and
sentenced to death in spite of innocence. P. 189; Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. 2003) (en
banc); Clemmons v. Delo, 124 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1997). In two other cases, Ossman was found
ineffective, but those judgments were vacated on procedural grounds and Ossman's clients were
executed. Nave v. Delo, 62 F.3d 1024 (8th Cir. 1995); Bolder v.Armontrout, 921 F.2d 1359 (8th Cir.
1990).
70.

LIEBMAN ET AL.,

supra note 16, at 413-15.
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federal courts from exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction over the constitutional claims of capital prisoners. Three years prior to Coleman, an ad hoc
committee appointed by Chief Justice William Rehnquist studied the system
of habeas corpus review of capital cases and reported that the primary cause
of unfairness and delay was the prisoners' lack of access to qualified legal
representation. 7 ' The Court in Coleman missed an opportunity to correct the
situation; it could have held that prisoners who were the victims of legal
malpractice in state postconviction proceedings could nevertheless have
their cases fully heard in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Such a holding
would have given states the incentive to adequately fund indigent defense
systems, but their failure to do so would not prevent capital prisoners from
having the constitutionality of their convictions and sentences decided in
federal courts.
CONCLUSION

In addition to reducing executions through competent representation,
Professor White sees the work of dedicated capital defense lawyers as eroding support for the death penalty by making us all aware of three significant
problems: "[f]irst, too many defendants are sentenced to death; [s]econd, too
many capital defendants are not afforded adequate representation by their
defense attorneys; [t]hird, at least in some cases, death sentences are imposed on defendants whose diminished moral culpability does not justify
this punishment" (p. 203).
Professor White's telling of the gripping stories of capital defense lawyers and their clients reflects his well-known passion for human rights.
More importantly, his book highlights some needed reforms in the field of
capital litigation. The Strickland standard clearly needs to be strengthened to
assure that capital defendants are represented by defense teams who thoroughly investigate their cases. Doctrinally, Taylor, Wiggins, and Rompilla
are steps in the right direction, as is their recognition of the ABA Guidelines
as appropriate professional norms governing the performance of capital defense counsel. However, as long as the Coleman doctrine rewards states that
under-fund indigent defense, there is no realistic possibility that the death
penalty can be reliably and fairly administered. I agree with Professor White
that abolition is the best solution.

7 I. Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, Report on Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 45 CRIM. L. REP. 3239 (1989).

